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I. Introduction  
Sex and gender are two distinct concepts.1 Academics have pondered the contours of sex and 
gender and documented their ruminations in myriad written contributions to society’s conversation 
on gender and sex.2 Other than the notion that gender and sex are unique, people hardly agree on 
how to use the terms across a variety of issues confronting society.3 In the face of this discussion, 
American courts use sex and gender interchangeably.4 When courts apply the narrow definition of 
sex—that which is assigned at birth—courts affirm and perpetuate the gender binary, that of male 
and female.5 The gender binary excludes nonbinary individuals—those that do not identify as male 
or female.6 This exclusion is impermissible because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.7 Without a standard approach to the statutory interpretation of sex and 
gender, courts reach inconsistent decisions when faced with similar facts.8 This paper argues that 
 
1 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law 
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995) (‘“Sex refers to the anatomical and physiological distinctions 
between men and women; ‘gender,’ by contrast, is used to refer to the cultural overlay on those anatomical and 
physiological distinctions.”). 
2 See Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894 (2019) (discussing gender nonconformity); 
Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, “Because of . . . Sex”: Rethinking the Protections Afforded Under Title VII in the Post-
Oncale World 69 ALB. L. REV. 139, n.8 (2006) (“Some courts define sex in the narrowest of terms as a biological 
distinction. . .Other courts have looked to a more holistic definition of sex to include gender identity.”); Francisco 
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” Gender,” and “Sexual 
Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 22 (1995). 
3 See Melinda D. Anderson, The Resurgence of Single-Sex Education, THE ATLANTIC, December 22, 2015 
(discussing “the benefits and limitations of schools that segregate based on gender”); Dan Levin, North Carolina 
Reaches Settlement on ‘Bathroom Bill’, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2019; Vanessa Fuhrmans, What #MeToo Has to Do 
With the Workplace Gender Gap, THE WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2018 (“The #MeToo movement has thrown a glaring 
spotlight on the gender gap in the workplace.”); Malika Andrews, How Should High School Define Sexes for 
Transgender Athletes?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2017 (explaining how “widespread disagreement over where the line 
should be drawn between sexes for purposes of athletic competition” is particularly challenging at the high school 
level); Keri Blakiner, Can We Build a Better Women’s Prision?, The Washington Post Magazine, Oct. 28, 2019 
(explaining that American prisons were built for men, and women have a different incarceration experience and if 
we want to see different outcomes, then we’d best incorporate different practices). 
4 Infra Section II.b; Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[F]or purposes of [Title VII], 
the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ have become interchangeable.”) 
5 Infra Section IV.c. 
6 See Naomi Schoenbaum, The New Law of Gender Nonconformity, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(quoting Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of A Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
757, 795) (explaining that “partial gender nonconformers [] ‘reject discreet aspects of their prescribed gender code 
while maintaining conformity with others”’).  
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
8 Infra Section II.b, Part III. 
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courts’ interchangeable use of gender and sex assigned at birth leads them to make decisions based 
on sex stereotypes and deny gender nonconforming individuals equal rights; thus, courts should 
interpret sex assigned at birth as gender.  
This paper proceeds in six parts. Part II defines sex and gender and examines courts’ use of the 
two terms. It looks to various cases across several areas of law to show that the Supreme Court, 
and all lower courts, use sex and gender interchangeably. This part concludes by explaining how 
the lack of uniformity leads to inconsistent opinions and such inconsistency results in the denial 
of justice. Part III establishes that the interchangeable use of sex and gender impermissibly limits 
the protections afforded to citizens of the United States. This part shows the harms of sex 
stereotyping, and how the courts have come to rely upon it. It explains that courts’ reliance on sex 
assigned at birth, and sex stereotypes limit gender nonconforming individuals’ access to justice. 
Part IV suggests that a remedy to the harms resulting from the inconsistent use of sex and gender 
is interpret “sex” as gender. This part admits that establishing this standard will not revolutionize 
American law. Because of the current inconsistencies, not all decisions have impermissibly 
excluded gender nonconforming individuals. However, as this part discusses, currently, the courts 
rely on the presumption of a gender binary. It examines the exclusionary effect of courts’ use of 
sex on gender nonconforming individuals and suggests that a standard interpretation of sex as 
gender would remedy this exclusion. This part concludes by clarifying the distinction between sex-
based gender stereotypes and gender discrimination. Part V addresses potential counter arguments 
to the suggestion that courts interpret sex as gender to interpret statutes. It summarizes several 
arguments against interpreting sex as gender and highlights the importance of equal treatment of 
the laws. This part also responds to the ubiquitous support for sex segregated spaces—primarily 
bathrooms—by reminding readers that the assumption that same-sex segregated spaces are no-sex 
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spaces is rooted in the lie of the unanimity of heterosexuality. As such, sex segregation in such 
private and intimate spaces does not serve to protect the privacy of those spaces. Finally, this paper 
concludes by recognizing that at times, the law already affords equal protection to individuals 
irrespective of their sex assigned at birth conceptually but standardizing the interpretation of sex 
as gender will insure equality and justice for all.  
II. Sex and gender are not the same, but courts use them interchangeably  
 This part seeks to clarify the distinction between sex and gender and show why it is 
important that the courts recognize that distinction. Through inconsistent approaches and treatment 
of these two concepts, the courts deny legal protections based on historic notions of sex and gender 
identity,9 which no longer retain their past significance.10 The Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that sex stereotyping is “made on the basis of gender,”11 however the Court remains inconsistent 
in its recognition of the distinction between sex and gender. This failure to distinguish sex and 
gender has led the Court to limit its application of the law to only the traditional male and female 
identities, which is underinclusive of the spectrum that gender represents. This under inclusiveness 
results in decisions and laws that deny justice to individuals whose gender identities do not match 
the traditional sexes—male and female.  
a. Distinguishing sex from gender  
In order to understand the harm that stems from a lack of uniform treatment of sex and 
gender, one must first understand that sex and gender are distinct concepts. Sex is the more 
traditional of the two and is generally assigned to an individual at their birth based on their 
 
9 Infra Sections II.b, III.a. 
10 See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (noting that the relevant statues were “from an era 
when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are”). 
11 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).  
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perceived anatomy.12   ‘“[S]ex refers to the anatomical and physiological distinctions between men 
and women; ‘gender,’ by contrast, is used to refer to the cultural overlay on those anatomical and 
physiological distinctions.”13 Gender is an individual’s “socially constructed roles, behaviors, 
expressions and identities . . . There is considerable diversity in how individuals and groups 
understand, experience and express gender through the roles they take on, the expectations placed 
on them, relations with others and the complex ways that gender is institutionalized in society.”14 
Even at this simple stage of biological physical characteristics, individuals do not always 
fit neatly into the binary and those that do not are disadvantaged in our binary-centric legal 
system.15 Equal treatment of the laws is denied to individuals because they are different when the 
law only recognizes male and female sexes. When an individual’s sex does not match their gender, 
they are gender nonconforming. In cases of gender nonconformity, courts still look to an 
individual’s sex,16 furthering the confusion and inconsistency on how courts are to treat gender 
and sex. 
b. Courts use sex and gender interchangeably 
Courts have remained inconsistent with their use of gender and sex over the years.17 
Without a clear understanding of how the Court defines sex and gender, it is difficult to understand 
 
12 Valdes, supra note 2, at 47. 
13 Case, supra note 1, at 10. 
14 Canadian Inst. of Health Research, What is gender? What is sex?, https;//cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/4862.html (last updated 
Apr. 4, 2020). Throughout this paper, I refer to gender and gender identity interchangeably.  
15 INTERACT ADVOCATES FOR INTERSEX YOUTH, interactadvocates.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) (“There are many 
possible differences in genitalia, hormones, internal anatomy, or chromosomes, compared to the usual two ways that 
human bodies develop. . . . About 1.7% of people are born intersex. . . . [One] in 2,000 babies (0.05% of humans) 
are born with genital differences that a doctor might suggest changing with unnecessary surgery.”); see generally 
Clarke, supra note 1. 
16 See Schoenbaum supra note 6 (explaining that gender nonconformity doctrine is based on sex, and illustrating 
how that is problematic for transgender individuals specifically). 
17 Kirshenbaum, supra note 2, at n.8 (“Some courts define sex in the narrowest of terms as a biological distinction. . 
.Other courts have looked to a more holistic definition of sex to include gender identity.”)  
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and apply various laws that rely on sex or gender identity, for both litigants and lower courts.18 
Without a consistent application between the use of gender and sex, the Court’s decisions remain 
unpredictable and capricious. If the Court were to use gender instead of sex when interpreting 
laws, they could cure this inconsistency and protect and promote justice.  
Some courts hold fast to the congressional intent of sex, that which is defined by biological 
characteristics.19  While others are more willing to recognize the importance of gender identity 
when dealing with Title VII’s “because of . . . sex.”20 In either situation, the lower courts are simply 
left to their own devices in determinations and definitions relating to the decision of sex or gender. 
But in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court correctly refers to the plaintiff’s projection of 
feminine and masculine attributes as her gender.21  The Court takes care to note, that while this 
employment discrimination lawsuit is under Title VII’s “because of . . . sex” language, the 
plaintiff’s anatomy and corresponding sex assigned at birth are not at issue.22 Rather, it is the 
plaintiff’s gender that is the source of the litigation—and more specifically, it is her failure to 
conform her gender performance to her employer’s expectations.23 But the Court has yet to 
mandate a standard, resulting in a fractured and incoherent legal system.24 
 
18 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (outlining the various 
interpretations of Title VII as it relates to sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination). 
19 Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Congress intended the term 
sex to mean biological male or biological female, and not one’s sexuality or sexual orientation.”) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
20 See Nichols v. Aztec Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that harassment for failure to conform to 
“gender-based stereotypes” is actionable discrimination “because of . . . sex” under Title VII). 
21 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (explaining that Anne Hopkins was treated differently 
because she was a woman acting in a manner her peers only expected and wanted men to act). However, the court 
still conflated sex and gender throughout the opinion but are consistent in their belief that Hopkins’ sex assigned at 
birth is not the problem here. 
22 Id. at 256. 
23 Id.  
24 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (Noting that the current system 
“creates a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for 
just that act.”) (internal citations omitted). The court goes on to explain that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), 
made it clear that when “a person who is discriminated against because of the protected characteristic of one with 
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Even throughout the course of a single case, litigants and lower courts interchangeably use 
sex and gender. In United States v. Virginia, Virginia sought to continue excluding women from 
their all male school under the theory that women could not withstand the rigors and challenges of 
what made the school unique, nor would women want to withstand them.25 The arguments for 
admitting women were based on the Fourteenth Amendment26 and the Equal Protection Clause.27 
Thus Virginia had to demonstrate that as the “party seeking to uphold government action based on 
sex [they] must establish an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.”28 
Additionally, the reliance on the classification must “serve[] important governmental objective[s] 
and the discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”29 
Since the relevant applicable laws did not specify gender or sex, the courts’ and the 
litigants’ employed various uses of sex and gender through the procedural journey that brought the 
case to the Supreme Court. Virginia sought to highlight the “pedagogical benefits” afforded by 
“single-sex education,”30 while “[t]he District Court made ‘findings’ on ‘gender-based’ 
developmental differences.”31 At the appellate level, the Fourth Circuit found that “two single-sex 
programs” served Virginia’s goal of “single-gender education.”32 Throughout the litigation, courts 
and litigants both interchangeably used sex and gender to primarily mean gender. They were 
 
whom she associates is actually being disadvantaged because of her own traits.” Hively, 853 F.3d at 347. Because of 
this, the court reasons that “it is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without 
discriminating on the basis of sex.” Id. at 351. Because the Court has not set forth a comprehensive and workable 
standard, the circuits continue to reach different results when considering similar facts under the same law.  
25 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540 (1996). 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
27 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.  
28 Id. at 524 (internal quotes omitted). 
29 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
30 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535. 
31 Id. at 541. 
32 Id. at 546. 
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discussing the “social generalizations”33 attributable to gender, rather than the students’ sex 
assigned at birth.  
Discussing the broad spectrum of characteristics and identities that compose gender makes 
the discussion much less black and white than the dichotomy of binary sex would. Whether it be 
across terms and cases, or at various levels of the litigation pathway, courts inconsistently use sex 
and gender. Such inconsistent treatment excludes individuals who are not a part of the gender 
binary that the inconsistent treatment promotes.34 Here too, the Court did not land on a consistent 
or standardized application or use of sex or gender, to the detriment of all.35 
However, in some instances the Court returns to past decisions to reframe the issues of sex 
and gender. In Nguyen v. I.N.S., the Court discussed the transfer of citizenship to nonmartial 
children born outside the United States.36 Throughout the opinion, the Court references the gender 
of the parents, but in this instance, they mean sex. The Court is discussing biological characteristics 
as they relate to pregnancy, not identities and behavior of the individuals. Several years later, the 
Court revisits the issue of the transfer of citizenship to nonmarital children born outside of the 
United States in Sessions v. Morales-Santana.37 The Court explains that the law is rooted in gender 
stereotypes, because even though it deals with the sex of the parents in their reproductive roles, 
 
33 Robin Dembroff et al. What Taylor Swift and Beyonce Teach Us About Sex and Causes, 14 L. &  SOC’Y 
DISCRIMINATION J. 1, 3 (2020). 
34 The inconsistent use of sex and gender throughout various opinions across all levels of the judiciary allow the 
court to limit gender to the binary of male and female. While gender is more expansive than sex—even with this 
binary understanding, this understanding of gender fails to include any individuals not part of the binary.  
35 Throughout United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) the Court (along with the lower courts and litigants) 
interchangeably used sex and gender.  
36 Nguyen v. I.N.S., 553 U.S. 53 (2001). 
37 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690–91 (2017) (noting that the pertinent legislation and opinions 
were supported by “two once habitual, but now untenable, assumptions” that the husband was dominant and that 
women where “natural and sole guardian[s] of a nonmarital child”). 
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the law does not recognize science, but notions of propriety based on sex-based gender 
stereotypes38 that the Court refuses to uphold.  
This part has shown that courts use sex and gender inconsistently. This inconsistent and 
unforeseeable application of these distinct words leads only to uncertainty and the denial of justice. 
At times, the Court correctly applies gender and sex, but they have yet to establish a standard 
binding the lower courts to uniformity. The next part will explain how the inconsistent use harms 
individuals who do not align with the Court’s traditional notion of sex.  
III. The interchangeable use of sex and gender impermissibly limits the protections of the 
law 
While the previous parts have shown that sex and gender are distinct concepts, and courts 
use sex and gender unpredictably and inconsistently, this part demonstrates how the 
interchangeable use of sex and gender harm individuals. First, the Court’s failure to use gender in 
the place of sex has led it to create subcategories of sex discrimination relating to gender in order 
to protect certain individuals. This approach leads to sex stereotyping which undermines the rights 
of gender nonconformers.39  Additionally, the Courts’ reliance on traditional male and female 
gender identities when appropriately discussing gender alienate individuals who do not identify as 
binary. The part concludes by accepting that Courts occasionally do correctly use sex and gender, 
but the lack of a standard use of sex or gender leads to inconsistent and competing opinions that 
fail to afford every individual equal protection under the laws.  
 
38 The court’s use of gender in this instance is akin to Price Waterhouse, rooting gender discrimination in 
presumptions based on an individual’s sex. This paper suggests that sex be removed from gender entirely, and that is 
why this sex-based gender understanding is only a step in the right direction, rather than an example worth 
emulating. 
39 Schoenbaum, supra note 6. 
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a. Sex stereotyping is gender-based, but still referred to in terms of sex 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins laid the foundation for sex stereotyping claims.40 Anne 
Hopkins was denied partnership at Price Waterhouse and she claimed that it was sex 
discrimination.41 The practice at Price Waterhouse was once a name was submitted for partnership, 
current partners who knew the individual would submit written comments on the candidate to an 
Admissions Committee who makes a recommendation to the Policy Board, then the Policy Board 
decides whether to submit the candidate for a vote by the entire partnership.42 After she was denied 
partnership, a member of the Policy Board explained to Hopkins that her chances for partnership 
would increase if she would “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, 
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”43 In addition, comments submitted about 
Hopkins mentioned that she was “macho,” “that she ‘over compensated for being a woman,’” and 
“advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’”44 The court explained that abrasiveness and 
subpar interpersonal skills are acceptable characteristics to mention and consider when reviewing 
an individual as a senior manager.45 But the court concluded that these observations were made 
because Hopkins was a “woman manager.”46 Eventually the court held that when a plaintiff can 
prove that their “gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may 
avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”47 
 
40 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
41 Id. at 232. 
42 Id. at 233. 
43 Id. at 235. 
44 Id. (internal citations omitted).   





Another instance of gender stereotyping came before a court in in Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., via a dress code.48 However, the court refused to consider the gender-based 
implications as such because men and women were affected by the policy.49 The plaintiff, Darlene 
Jespersen unsuccessfully attempted to use the Price Waterhouse prohibition on sex stereotyping to 
invalidate her employer’s policy requiring women to wear make-up.50 Jespersen claimed in 
relevant part that the policy discriminated against women by forcing them to conform to a sex-
based stereotype.51 The majority distinguished Jespersen’s situation from that in Price Waterhouse 
by explaining that Hopkins was clearly the victim of sex-stereotyping because the traits that were 
holding her back from advancement were lauded in her male coworkers.52 Here, the court found 
that the dress code at issue applied equally to both men and women, did not impede workers from 
doing their job, and most importantly was not motivated by stereotypes.53 Rather than addressing 
undeniable stereotypes that support the notion that women need to wear makeup and men cannot 
wear makeup, the court analyzed the attendant burdens of the policy.54 The court concluded that 
overall, the policy was reasonable and did not unduly burden women.55 
Courts are hesitant to extend the Price Waterhouse prohibition to situations involving 
sexual orientation to find actionable discrimination because of sex. The court’s reasoning suggests 
that the connection between sex and sexual orientation is too attenuated.56 In Simonton, the court 
explained that perhaps it would be possible to claim sexual orientation-based discrimination and 
 
48 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005). 
49 Id. at 1109 (“While [the dress code’s] requirements differ according to gender, none on its face places a greater 
burden on one gender than the other.”)  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1108. 
52 Id. at 1111. 
53 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2005).  
54 Id. at 1111. 
55 Id. (affirming the lower court’s grant of summary judgement regarding Jespersen’s unequal burden claim). 
56 Simonton v. Runyon, 225 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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for it to be actionable under Title VII because of a failure to conform to gender norms.57 But the 
court refused to consider the argument by finding that Simonton failed to plead the facts 
sufficiently to make such a claim.58  
The Ninth Circuit embraced the minority position in deciding that when “verbal abuse [is] 
closely linked to gender” it is because of sex and actionable under Title VII in Nichols v. Aztec 
Restaurant Enterprises.59 Antonio Sanchez was an effeminate man who did not meet his coworkers’ 
“views of a male stereotype.”60 After relentless taunting and abuse because of his failure to 
conform to the traditional male stereotype, Sanchez was fired.61 Relying heavily on Price 
Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit found that this abuse was based on sex because it was primarily 
sex-stereotyping.62 The court goes to great lengths to show that the taunting, and the name calling, 
and the derogatory comments, were based on Sanchez’s gender.63 Sanchez’s “male co-workers 
and one of his supervisors repeatedly reminded [him] that he did not conform to their gender-based 
stereotypes . . . [a]nd, the most vulgar name-calling . . . was cast in female terms.”64 But the 
determination of the harassment being based in gender is not part of the decision, the court still 
relied on the narrower definition of sex.65 After finding that this is gender-based discrimination, 
the court stated that “[u]nder Price Waterhouse, Sanchez must prevail”66—even though Price 




59 Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).  
60 Id. at 869. 
61 Id. at 871 (Sanchez was fired for walking off his shift to escape abuse). 
62 Id. at 875. 
63 Id. at 874 (“At its essence, the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that Sanchez did not act as a 
man should act.”). 
64 Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001). 
65 Id. at 875 (holding that the verbal abuse “occurred because of sex”). 
66 Id. at 875. 
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gender, the courts and the legislatures continue to use and understand sex in the narrowest legal 
sense. 
b. Relying on sex assigned at birth and traditional ideas of gender excludes nonbinary 
individuals 
Some courts try to further the cause of equality and adapt with the times but end up 
negatively impacting the progress with their reliance upon incorrect gender stereotypes.  For 
instance, in 2001, a Florida court had to decide how a marriage statute affected a couple in which 
one of the individuals was transgender.67 At the time, same-sex marriage was illegal so the analysis 
hinged on the legal sex of Michael Kantaras, an individual assigned female sex at birth, who later 
successfully completed sex reassignment surgery.68 After the surgery, Michael married Linda in  
1989 then adopted Linda’s son from a previous relationship, as Linda’s husband. 69 In 1992, Linda 
had a daughter after she was artificially inseminated with Michael’s brother’s sperm.70 In 1998, 
Michael filed for divorce and sought custody of the children.71 Linda responded by claiming that 
the marriage was never legally valid as it violated Florida’s ban on same-sex marriage.72 Similarly, 
the adoption contravened Florida’s prohibition on homosexual adoption, and Michael was not the 
biological father of the daughter.73  After considering the facts, and looking to the best interest of 
the children, the trial court found for Michael, and the appellate court reversed.74 
In their factual findings, the trial court focused on Michael’s gender, explaining that 
“Michael in his appearance, characteristics and behavior was perceived as a man.”75 In addition, 
 
67 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 156. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 161. 
75 Id. at 156. 
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he had other legal documents before his marriage license that identified him legally as a man.76 
The trial court found this sufficient to hold that legally Michael was a man, and therefore the 
marriage was valid and thus they could properly grant a divorce and award custody in the best 
interest of the children. 77 
In reversing, the appellate court looked to cases in Texas, Ohio, and Kansas to justify their 
holding that sexual performance is the final indicator of sex.78 Even though Michael had surgically 
removed all of his female sex organs and had grown a penis,79 he was not sufficiently male in the 
eyes of the court. The court did note that while the majority approach was to deny the right to 
marry to transgender individuals, “when a transsexual person has successfully undergone sex-
reassignment and can fully function sexually in the reassigned sex, then the person could marry 
legally as a member of the sex finally indicated.”80  
The court explained that this was a matter of public policy.81 Their understanding was that 
the legislature had made it clear that the marriage laws were not to apply to transgender individuals 
because the common use of male and female did not include transgenders.82 For marriage, the 
courts may only look to the individuals’ “sex determined by their biological sex at birth” regardless 
 
76 Id. (The court notes that Michael had “been accepted as a man in a variety of social and legal ways, such as 
having a male driving license; male passport; male name change; male modification of his birth certificate” as well 
as fulfilling the traditional male role in the lives of his children.) 
77 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). (The appellate court notes that their ruling 
does not take into account the best interests of the children even though the “trial judge went to great lengths to 
determine” their best interests.) 
78 Id. at 160. 
79 Id. at 157. 
80 Id. at 160. 
81 Id. at 161 (“Whether advances in medical science support a change in the meaning commonly attributed to the 
terms male and female as they are used in the Florida marriage statutes is a question that raise issues of public policy 
that should be addressed by the legislature.”) 
82 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
14 
  
of societal or scientific advancements.83 In short, the court determined that the laws at issue were 
only to apply to individuals that fit into traditionally accepted notions of male and female.  
Even in more recent terms, the Court uses gender to discuss sex and continues to limit 
gender to the traditional binary of male and female. Over several cases the Court opined on the 
constitutionality of separate qualifications for unwed men and women regarding their ability to 
transmit their citizenship to their children.84 Initially, the Court found the sex discrimination 
warranted.85 The Court reasoned that Congress passed the law to ensure that only children who 
had strong ties to the United States would receive citizenship when born to only one citizen parent 
outside the nation’s borders.86 It was clear to the Court that a woman who just gave birth to a child 
would know that it was hers, a bond would be formed, and the mother would take care of the child 
and teach it about America for the next eighteen years.87  
However, determining the biological parenthood of the father is not as simple in the eyes 
of the Court, and this distinction is sufficient to warrant unequal treatment.88 The point is that a 
man can be a father and never know, but the Court posits that it is impossible for a woman to not 
know when she is a mother, because she must give birth.89 Because a man must take more steps to 
prove that a child is his, it makes sense that he should have a higher burden to satisfy before passing 
on his citizenship status to his child.90 The assumption that the Court makes with this holding is 
 
83 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
84 Nguyen v. I.N.S., 553 U.S. 53, 56 (2001) (“Title 8 U.S.C. § 1409 governs the acquisition of United States 
citizenship by persons born to one United States citizen parent and one noncitizen parent when the parents are 
unmarried and the child is born outside of the United States or its possessions. The statute imposes different 
requirements for the child's acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or the 
father.”).  
85 Id. at 62.  
86 Id. at 65.  
87 Id. at 62. 
88 Id. 




that women will bond immediately with their children because they are mothers, and fathers need 
more time to forge the adequate bond with their child to ensure the child is sufficiently American.91 
The Court concludes by explaining that “the difference between men and women in relation to the 
birth process is a real one and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address 
the problem . . . in a manner specific to each gender.”92  
Sixteen years later, the Court changed its mind.93 Relying heavily on past decisions, the 
Court comes to the conclusion that “lump characterization of [traditional gender roles as they relate 
to child rearing], however, no longer passes equal protection inspection.”94 The Court explains that 
the relevant statues were “from an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad 
generalizations about the way men and women are.”95 The Court realized that their assumptions 
about the actions of individuals based on their gender “cannot withstand inspection under a 
Constitution that requires the Government to respect the equal dignity and stature of its male and 
female citizens.”96 Looking to the intent of Congress when passing this legislation, the Court 
decided that the outcome most in line with the congressional intent was to abolish the exception 
for unwed mothers and institute an identical policy for all children born outside of the United 
States.97 This opinion was more of a temporary fix in that the Court concluded that “Congress may 
address the issues and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any 
 
91 Id. The Court points that this is especially true in light of all the military men deployed overseas and the increase 
in overseas travel. While women can control where the child is born, men can impregnate women and leave being 
none the wiser.  
92 Id. at 72. 
93 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017) (holding “that the gender line Congress drew is 
incompatible with the requirement that the government accord to all persons the equal protection of the laws”). 
94 Id. at 1695. 
95 Id. at 1689. 
96 Id. at 1698.  
97 Id. at 1700.  
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person on the basis of gender.”98 Even while accepting that rights cannot be denied on the basis of 
gender, the Court continues to limit gender to male and female.  
This part examined courts’ interchangeable use of sex and gender across a variety of cases 
and an assortment of laws. It established that there is no discernable reason for the courts’ varying 
use of the distinct words, however, it did show the unequal and arbitrary impact on individuals. 
Because the Court has not defined gender and sex, especially as they relate to stereotypes, they 
continue to issue inconsistent and unforeseeable opinions. The next part suggests that the solution 
is for courts to focus on gender rather than sex when interpreting laws.  
IV. Applying the new standard 
This part suggests that courts should always interpret sex as gender. Gender is more precise 
than sex in this context, because courts are already occasionally looking to gender when the law 
uses the language of “sex.”99 Additionally, gender identity is more inclusive than sex assigned at 
birth. This new policy furthers the democratic notions of our nation: liberty and justice for all.  
a. The new standard 
When the courts are presented with problems of inequality arising from disparate treatment 
because of sex, it is largely actually because of gender.  Because the distinction between gender 
and sex is commonly misunderstood, gender-based stereotyping is misidentified as sex-based 
stereotyping.100 Even though Title VII101 and other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964102 
 
98 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701 (2017). 
99 See discussion supra Section II.b. 
100 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that sex-stereotyping is impermissible under 
Title VII). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. 
102 Civil Rights Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6 (2018). 
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clearly state that the alleged discrimination cannot be “because of. . . sex,”103 since the 
impermissible discrimination is based on how the plaintiffs are presenting themselves,104 or how 
they are perceived105 rather than their sex assigned at birth based on their perceived genitalia, it is 
actually stereotypes based on gender rather than sex. Thus, once the law recognizes gender in place 
of sex, the expansive and justified prohibitions on gender-based stereotypes set forth in Price 
Waterhouse106 will be expanded beyond discrimination based on sex assigned at birth and there 
will be equal protection under the law for individuals regardless of their conformity to the 
traditional gender binary. 
When faced with determining sex and gender a  district court in California first noted that 
“the line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ 
because that line does not exist, save as a lingering and faulty judicial construct.”107 The court 
“finds that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex or gender discrimination.”108 The 
court does not differentiate between sex and gender because they see the line as being too blurry—
to the point of being indistinguishable.109 Determining where sex ends and gender begins would 
be less important if the law recognized gender instead of sex. Because gender identity is more 
expansive and encompasses more expressions than sex assigned at birth, legal rights and 
protections would not depend on splitting hairs. 
 
103 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.  
104 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff was fired for refusing to wear 
makeup in compliance with a new dress code). 
105 Simonton v. Runyon, 225 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000) (in which an employee is harassed because his coworkers 
thought he was gay). 
106 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
107 Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159 (Cal. Dist. 2015). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (‘”the line between discrimination based on gender stereotyping and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is blurry, at best’. . . the distinction is illusory and artificial”) (internal citations omitted).  
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While it is true that sex assigned at birth, and sexual orientation are unique and distinct 
attributes belonging to an individual, they are inexplicably linked.110 Generally speaking, sex (the 
physical attributes of an individual) is a component of attraction. This attraction then informs 
sexual orientation. When an employer fires an employee for the employee’s sexual orientation, 
they are fired because they are not conforming to the expectations and presumptions the employer 
has formed based off of their assessment of the employee’s gender. In this way, the employee is 
fired impermissibly because of sex. Such mental gymnastics would not be required if Title VII 
were to read “because of . . . gender” rather than “because of . . . sex.” 
Using gender rather than sex is not to be relegated solely to the courts. Already some 
progressive states have drafted legislation that uses gender identity rather than the traditional 
sex.111 One legislative effort—that intentionally disregards sex assigned at birth—is California 
Senate Bill 826.112 The bill mandates that at the end of 2019, every public corporation whose 
principal executive offices are located in California must have at least one female on their board.113 
Then, by 2021, the company’s board must have an appropriate male to female ratio as set forth by 
the bill.114 As far as the bill is concerned, ‘“female’ means an individual who self-identifies her 
gender as a woman, without regard to the individual’s sex designated at birth.”115 California’s 
reasoning is reminiscent of bona fide occupational qualification logic.116 According to various 
 
110 See Valdes, supra note 2, at 10.    
111 See N.J. Stat. §26:8–40.12 (Known as the Babs Siperstein Law, this allows for individuals to change their name 
and gender on birth certificates to male, female, or undesignated/non-binary). 
112 Cal. Corp. Code § 301.3. 
113 Id. 
114 Cal. Corp. Code § 301.3(b)(1-3) (For corporations with six or more directors, they shall have at least three female 
directors. A board of five directors needs at least two females, and a board of four directors needs only one female.) 
115 Cal. Corp. Code § 301.3(f)(1).  
116 See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, 915 (1981) 
(explaining that a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) is a “narrow exception [to Title VII that] applies 
only in situations where all or substantially all members of a protected class are unable to perform the duties of the 
job in question”); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (finding that being male in a maximum-security 
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studies and reports that the bill cites, increasing the number of women on the corporate boards will 
“boost the California economy” and increase equality generally.117 Essentially, they are saying that 
only women can do this job, because they are women. But the purpose of the act is to increase 
gender equality. 
The law is clear that sex assigned at birth is not what matters, rather it is a person’s gender 
identity. The state believes that this diversity of genders on corporate boards is going to increase 
the economic performance of the state. The bill claims that “publicly held companies perform 
better when women serve on their boards of directors,”118 and women are more likely to create 
more sustainable futures for the corporations.119 
The law highlights a key difference between sex and gender. Sex is assigned; individuals 
and society inform the individual of how their physiology defines them. Gender identity is 
embraced and developed in recognition of autonomy and liberty. Even though either iteration of 
the law would ensure that women are more fully represented on corporate boards, what purpose 
does the California legislature achieve by intentionally using gender rather than sex? By using 
gender, the legislature accepts that sex assigned at birth is not as controlling as it once was.  
Currently there is confusion and inconsistencies in courts’ use of sex and gender. Courts 
are unsure of where to draw the line and are struggling to apply these meaningful distinctions.120 
A lack of clarity and uniformity can make the related subjects of sex and gender confusing and 
 
male prison was a BFOQ for the prison guards because a woman’s success as a prison guard would be “directly 
reduced by her womanhood”). 
117 2018 Cal SB 826 § 1(a). 
118 2018 Cal SB 826 §1(c). 
119 2018 Cal SB 826 §1(c)(3). 
120 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the line 
between a gender nonconformity claim and a sexual orientation claim is “gossamer-thin”); Videckis v. Pepperdine 
Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159 (Cal. Dist. 2015) (explaining that the line between sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation is illusory), 
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unpredictable. Since courts use gender sometimes and sex others, a standard mandating the use of 
gender when dealing with “sex” in the law will not completely upend the current system.  
b. The new standard will not change everything  
Not all of the conclusions of the cases above would change if sex were replaced with 
gender, which provides a degree of continuity in the Court’s precedent. But it is still a necessary 
one in order to promote and protect rights that are thus far bound to the binary of sex. Ideally, 
using gender in place of sex will reduce the legal use of stereotypes that the sex framework 
perpetuates. 
If the courts analyzed sexual discrimination claims through gender rather than sex, the 
outcome of Jespersen would be different.121 If the courts used gender instead of sex, employees 
would not need to prove that the discrimination was rooted in sex stereotypes to be actionable. It 
would not matter if Harrah’s policy was motivated by stereotype because it discriminates based on 
how employees present their gender identity in an unequal manner.122 Jespersen lost her job 
because she refused to conform to the notions of traditional gender stereotypes.123 Because she 
would not wear makeup, she could not be a bartender. But for her gender identity, she would still 
be a bartender at Harrah’s at the end of the litigation.   
Undoubtedly the policy did unduly burden women. The makeup requirements were quite 
extensive. The female employees had to purchase the makeup and then take time to apply the 
makeup. No similar requirement was placed on men. The court refused to address the unequal 
burden argument because Jespersen failed to submit “any documentation or any evidence of the 
 
121 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2005). 
122 Id. at 1118 (Kozinski, dissenting) (it is a “cultural assumption—and gender-based stereotype—that women’s 
faces are incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional without full makeup.”). 
123 See supra pp. 10–11. 
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relative cost and time required to comply with the grooming requirements by men and women.”124 
The court explained that grooming standards are not facially discriminatory because they 
differentiate between the genders, and because Harrah’s policy was reasonable.125 When 
considering the entire appearance regulation scheme, they did not find it to be impermissibly 
motivated by stereotypes.126 
While it is true that the court’s failure to take judicial notice of the burden imposed by the 
makeup requirement hurt Jespersen’s case,127 it should not have doomed it. Judge Kozinski’s 
dissent highlights the importance of gender in this case. The majority discounts Jespersen’s claims 
that wearing makeup is “inconsistent with her self-image”128 only because she is a woman, and 
society expects women to wear makeup. But it is completely reasonable for a man to find wearing 
makeup “burdensome and demeaning.”129 It is these gender stereotypes that have become 
ingrained in American society that uphold the majority’s determination that an employer’s dress 
code requiring women to wear makeup is reasonable. This is discrimination because of gender, 
and it should be illegal. This is not to say that there is no justification for employee dress codes, 
but the codes must not be based on something as arbitrary and capricious as stereotypes. Consider 
the requirement that construction workers wear hardhats while on jobsites.130 Undoubtedly this is 
rooted in the safety of the employee, and this is a reasonable requirement placed upon an employee 
by their employer. But note that the safety-based requirement applies irrespective of perceived 
gender identity.  
 
124 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 
125 Id. at 113. 
126 Id. 
127 Id.at 110. 
128 Id. at 1117. 
129 Id. at 1119. 
130 29 C.F.R. 1926.100(a) (“Employees working in areas where there is possible danger of head injury . . . shall be 
protected by protective helmets.”). 
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The analysis in United States v. Virginia did not hinge on the definition of sex or gender 
because either way the state was not in accordance with the equal protection clause in that they 
were not treating people equally by denying admittance to the school on an essentially arbitrary 
basis.131 It is not relevant that many women do not desire the education offered at VMI. So too 
there are plenty of men who do not want it! The salient point is that those women who were 
interested, did apply, and they were denied admission because of their gender. The Equal 
Protection Clause does not circumscribe its protections based on an individual’s identity. Rather, 
it mandates that “no state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person . . . 
the equal protection of the laws.”132 Undoubtedly this evidences that a more expansive definition 
of gender should be used in place of sex. The amendment does not read “deny any man or woman” 
or more classically just “deny any man.” The plain meaning of the amendment is that equal 
protection is a constitutional right to every individual regardless of their sex, and more importantly, 
regardless of their gender identity.133 
The crux of Virginia’s argument is that these male attributes are what one needs to thrive 
in this environment.134 They are not looking to sex, they are looking to the attitudes, the 
personalities, and the “social dimensions of personhood;”135 this is a gender classification. At this 
point, this distinction is largely pointless in that the Fourteenth Amendment does not refer to 
gender or sex.136 Indeed, here intermediate scrutiny was applied to analyze the actions and 
 
131 See supra pps. 6–7. 
132 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
133 See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (Discrimination on the basis of gender violates the equal protection 
clause.); Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (holding that gender distinctions affecting the 
transmission of citizenship at birth are a violation of equal protection). 
134 Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) 
(In both cases, the Court determined what women like, and how that should affect their opportunities in life, from 
education to employment.)   
135 Valdes supra note 2 at 21. 
136 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law 
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motivations of the school. Eventually, the Court held that the school was in violation of equal 
protection because having single-gender schools was not an important governmental objective and 
the gender discrimination was not substantially related to that objective.137 Women could not be 
denied access to the “prestige” of the institution without a comparable alternative because of 
Virginia’s “obligation to afford them genuinely equal protection.”138 
This is not to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to shatter the law’s 
dependence on the gender binary by using “person” rather than a series of gendered pronouns, as 
is the wont of legislatures. Congress, when ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, was clearly not 
considering the spectrum of gender and the rights of gender nonconformists.139 But, the use of 
person in the text is a strong indicator of the need for an expansive and pervasive reach of human 
rights and equal treatment of the laws.  
The appellate court in Kantaras was so caught up in the stereotypes and dichotomy of sex, 
that even though they cited public policy as supporting their conclusion, it was actually in direct 
opposition of public policy.140 The court in Kantaras accepts that their actions are in opposition to 
the best interest of the children involved.141 In a post Obergefell142 world, however, it is clear to 
see that the court acted in opposition of public policy. They denied a fundamental right to an 
individual based on their sex assigned at birth—regardless of the fact that Michael Kantaras had 
 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.” 
137 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555–57 (1996). 
138 Id. at 557. 
139 See generally Clarke, supra note 2.   
140 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
141 Id. 
142Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
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been successfully living as a man for several years. The court usurped his autonomy, and 
paternalistically decided how he should live his life based on who they decided he was.  
Michael Kantaras’s rights were impermissibly abridged because the court based their 
decision on his sex rather than his gender.143 Even without the mandates of Obergefell, if the 
Kantras’s compliance with the applicable marriage statute was viewed in light of the parties’ 
gender rather than sex, their marriage would have to be found valid and legally recognizable. 
Linda’s sex and gender were female.144 When Michael was born, his sex was female. But at the 
time of the marriage, his gender was male. Everyone accepts that “in his appearance, 
characteristics and behavior [he] was perceived as a man.”145 At the time of the marriage, there 
was a man and a woman in compliance with the Florida statute.  
The court in Nichols146 is no different than the court in Kantaras, in seeking to be 
progressive, they do more harm than good. If the court would have rooted their decision that 
Sanchez was harassed solely on the grounds that this was impermissible gender discrimination in 
violation of Title VII, they would have set a powerful precedent allowing for the prohibition of 
gender-based discrimination. Certainly, they needed to rely on Price Waterhouse to establish that 
the conduct of the coworkers was because of sex because it was gender-stereotyping. However, 
perhaps if they would have reduced the opinion’s emphasis on Price Waterhouse, they could have 
more clearly crystalized a national understanding that sexual orientation discrimination should be 
protected by Title VII as an extension of its prohibitions on sex-based gender stereotypes. To be 
 
143 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
144 Id. at 155. The court never explicitly states Linda’s sex or gender but assumes that she is female because she is 
pregnant and gives birth to children. 
145 Id. at 156. 
146 Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that harassment based on the 
employee’s failure to conform to the harasser’s gender assumptions was discrimination because of sex).  
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clear though, if the courts were using this new standard, the court would not have to look to Price 
Waterhouse. Under the new standard, the court could find that the plaintiff was fired because of 
his gender, which alone would be sufficiently actionable.  
This new standard is not as extreme as it may initially sound. There are times when the 
Court recognizes the importance of gender and makes their decision in accordance with the 
distinction between sex and gender.147 But still, there is uncertainty. The Court has shown that they 
know that gender is important, and America is far gone from the days where sex should be the 
basis of any decisions pertaining to legal rights. Even still, the Court has yet to make a rule; the 
Court has yet to say that sex is no longer the controlling factor. The Court has failed to end the 
marginalization and discrimination of gender nonconforming individuals. With all these cases of 
progress, the required result should not be uncertain when cases about sexual orientation and 
transgender discrimination arise.148 That is why a standardized approach in which courts interpret 
sex as gender is important and necessary.  
c. The binary presumption  
The problem with sex in this legal sense is that it assumes a dichotomy between male and 
female and excludes anyone who falls somewhere else along the spectrum. Even if the Court were 
to accept that sexual orientation is included under Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination 
 
147 See supra pps. 14–16 (outlining the transition from Ngyuen v. I.N.S. to Morales-Santana). 
148 Two cases are before the Court right now are, Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2931 (2019) 
(involving the termination of an individual because of their sexual orientation) and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2846 (2019) (involving the termination of an employee for being 
transgender) the outcome of neither of these cases is clear. While it is true that gender and sexual orientation are 
distinct, if the Court were to interpret sex as gender (short of overturning precedent) the outcome of these cases 




“because of . . . sex,”149 and even if the Court conferred Title VII protections to transgender 
people,150 anyone who does not identify as either male or female would face a more onerous task 
of proving actionable discrimination pursuant to the statute because they do not fit into the 
traditional binary of sex assigned at birth.151 
It is reported that about half a million people in America have a nonbinary gender 
identity.152 While discrimination against a nonbinary individual may fall afoul of Price 
Waterhouse, it would not be rooted in the narrow definition of sex that courts adamantly embrace. 
If the law instead were to forbid discrimination because of gender, then this would not be an issue. 
Gender “denotes the social constructions understood as “male” and “female” or “masculine” and 
feminine.’”153 It is more expansive and inclusive than the narrow sex designated at birth that 
currently permeates the law. The Court refuses to apply gender in the place of sex claiming that 
such matters of public policy belong to the legislature, but Justice Scalia noted that “it is ultimately 
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are 
governed.”154 As the Court in Oncale explains, male-on-male sexual harassment was “assuredly 
not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII” but that does not 
make it an unactionable claim as the lower court had held.155 There is precedent for the court to 
rely upon in disregarding public policy to preserve human rights.156  
 
149Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2931 (2019). 
150 R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2846 (2019). 
151 See Schoenbaum supra note 6 (discussing the burden of a nonconformity discrimination claim); Dembroff supra 
note 39 (discussing society’s role in the creation of gender).  
152 Clarke, supra note 2, at 896. 
153 Valdes, supra note 2, at 21. 
154 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
155 Id. 
156 See Id.; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overturning previous “separate but equal” standard by 
holding that separate is inherently unequal); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) (holding that marriage is 
a fundamental right and cannot be denied to same-sex couples). 
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It may still seem as if the distinction between sex and gender is not the paragon of 
importance when balancing gender against traditional notions of male and female. But, if ever they 
did, Americans no longer unanimously accept the gender binary.157 Fixing laws onto this arbitrary 
binary system impermissibly denies individuals who do not fit into the binary—for whatever 
reason—the equal protection of the laws.158 This is why courts should only look to gender rather 
than sex when determining and applying the law. Great uncertainty and inconsistency follow (for 
parties and lower courts) the Court’s indiscriminate use of sex and gender. Further, when courts 
do not consider gender, those individuals who do not conform to society’s expectations associated 
with the individual’s perceived sex are denied justice. Because the law’s current gender 
discrimination jurisprudence is rooted in the language of Title VII’s “because of . . . sex” even this 
legal understanding of gender stems from sex. Therefore, the law should cast off its dependence 
on sex and solely look to an individual’s gender—their “social dimension of personhood,”159 their 
“internal sense” of who they are.160  
d. Clarifying discrimination because of sex, and discrimination because of gender 
As evidenced in Price Waterhouse the “expectation of conformity” based on an 
individual’s appearance or actions is barred.161 Price Waterhouse made gender stereotyping a 
subcategory of sex discrimination, but with this definition, “gender stereotyping” is still rooted in 
 
157See Molly Igoe, Gender Identity: Significant Partisan and Gender Divides Remain, PRRI (Apr. 27, 2020, 10:46 
PM), https://www.prri.org/spotlight/gender-identity-significant-partisan-and-gender-divides-remain/ (“According to 
a 2019 PRRI Survey, just over half (55%) of Americans believe there are only two genders, including 43% who say 
they feel strongly about this.”) 
158 Cf. Sessions v Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017) (holing that “the gender line Congress drew is 
incompatible with the requirement that the government accord to all persons the equal protection of the laws”). 
159 Valdes, supra note 2, at 21. 
160 See Clarke, supra note 2, at 897. 
161 Schoenbaum, supra note 6. 
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sex.162 The previous cases illuminate this subtle but necessary distinction. Because the courts 
adamantly cling to the narrow definition of sex in order to provide deserved protections to gender 
nonconforming individuals, courts are forced to base the discriminatory actions on the sex of the 
plaintiff. This centers the issue on what society perceives the individual’s sex to be and how 
stereotypes informed the defendant’s expectations of the plaintiff’s behavior or appearance.163 
While it is encouraging that the courts are trying to expand the protections of the law in such a 
way, they are still rooting these protections in the binary of sex as it is traditionally used. If instead, 
the law forbade gender discrimination outright, the plaintiff’s sex would be irrelevant.  
This is most clearly illustrated in Jespersen.164  Jespersen was fired for refusing to comply 
with her employer’s dress code.165 Remember that the court did not see this as sex discrimination 
because there was a dress code for both men and women.166 However, if the law proscribed 
discrimination because of gender, it would not matter that there was a dress code for both men and 
women. “Jespersen introduced evidence that [wearing makeup] is inconsistent with her self-image 
and interferes with her job performance.”167 Irrespective of sex, Jespersen was fired for how she 
presented herself to the world; rather, she was fired for her failure to conform her image to the 
expectations of society. This is gender discrimination in its most basic form. And it is essential 
that we do not require an individual to base their harm in sex, for that promotes the notion that 
 
162 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group”). 
163 See Dembroff supra note 39 at 8 (explaining that individual-level traits will not explain why an individual was 
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only the binary sexes are worth or deserving of protection.168 This is why courts should use gender 
instead of sex, and this is why the distinction and clarity of language is important.  
 V. Responding to potential counter arguments  
The substitution of gender for sex is not without its own complications. For instance, 
because gender is more comprehensive and inclusive than sex, it could make any distinction based 
on any trait related to sex-stereotypes illegal. Additionally, one could argue that this proposal will 
upend the current social structure in an unacceptable way by giving legal rights to individuals 
based on their perceptions of themselves.  Further, and the reasoning most favored by the courts, 
using gender in place of sex is impossible because it is not what the legislatures intended, citing 
judicial restraint.169 There are also the social concerns to contend with as well. It seems difficult 
to talk about gender without also discussing bathrooms as is evidenced by the bevy of material 
ruminating over the issue of sex segregation and its relevance to gender.170 However, none of these 
concerns or arguments justify the discriminatory application and interpretation of law.  
The use and application of gender identity in the law will not put an undue emphasis on 
individuality and the specific facts of each case. Already, claims of discrimination and inequality 
are heavily reliant upon the specific facts of the case. Presently claims of sexual inequality and 
discrimination focus on the individual being discriminated against themselves. But that is not to 
 
168 Cf. Schoenbaum supra note 6 (explaining that transgender discrimination is only sex discrimination if you base 
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24, 2017 (outlining state and federal legislation and polices regarding gender identification and access to spaces like 
bathrooms from 2012 to 2017) [hereinafter “Transgender Access”]. 
30 
  
say that there will not be any changes to the system if the courts adopt gender in the place of sex. 
Primarily, and most importantly, access to justice and the courts will be increased by expanding 
the protections of the law beyond an assignment made at birth. The more expansive and permissive 
gender identity would sacrifice the administrative efficiency of the current binary sex standard in 
use. As legislatures get more comfortable with the Court’s anti-stereotyping principle to allow for 
gender nonconformity, courts still cling to “sex-specific rules they regard as reflecting comfortable 
gender conventions [that have] a trivial impact on women[.]”171 The Court has pointed out that 
even though stereotypes may hold true for the majority of a group, the fact that a single individual 
from that group does not conform to the stereotype proscribes the government from making laws 
based on the stereotype.172 
Sex is only part of an individual’s identity, so it should not be allowed to determine all of 
someone’s rights. But this is not to say that all differentiation between sex and gender should be 
eliminated, as an androgynous society is neither practical nor desirable. Diversity is a strength and 
differences should be celebrated; however, they should not be the basis of legal decisions 
circumscribing rights.  
While discussing making room for gender, Mary Anne C. Case fails to make room for the 
nonbinary, and it is her undoing. Case’s goal is to disaggregate sex from gender in the hopes that 
eventually gender “may wither away.”173 Her understanding is that because gender is exclusively 
defined through sex, then mayhap these categories that we find imperative now will fail to stand 
 
171 Clarke, supra note 2, at 917 (internal quotations omitted). 
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the test of time, much in the same way that we no longer discuss noble and common blood.174 
While it may be true that Case is correct in saying that “the world will not be safe for women in 
filly pink dresses . . . unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as well,”175 the issue is that 
Case insists on coding things as feminine and masculine, with no intention of ever removing sex 
from gender. For all this talk of disaggregating, there is little separation of gender identity and 
male and female.  
Another reason that Case is hesitant to replace sex with gender, specifically in relation to 
Title VII is that there may be some jobs that remain gendered— “even in the ideal world.”176 Case 
wishes to protect that which is “traditionally feminine without . . . limiting it to women, or limiting 
women to it.”177 But why must these characteristics and traits be feminine? And in the same vein, 
why must aggressiveness, protectiveness, assertiveness and the like be coded masculine? Gender 
can be a spectrum without plunging the world into “a sort of idealized androgyny.”178 
Coincidently, this is an appropriate response to everyone who claims that America will be 
doomed if gender neutral bathrooms replace the current sex-segregated spaces. Replacing sex with 
gender is not an argument for a world that looks the same filled with individuals who identify and 
conform to one standard, rather it is an argument for inclusion. The rhetoric and arguments 
employed to support sex-segregation generally are no longer tenable or coherent. “As the 
awareness and acceptability of same-sex desire have increased, the assumption that same-sex 
spaces are “no-sex” spaces has withered.” 179 In these intimate and private spaces, the focus should 
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not be on what other people look like anyway. As in other areas so to here, focusing on sex is a 
focus on the individual and in the context of bathrooms and locker rooms and other sex segregated 
spaces, the focus should be on the “safety and privacy of each individual,”180 not their physiology. 
Already “cities including Austin, Tex.; Berkeley, Calif.; Philadelphia; Santa Fe, N.M.; and Seattle” 
are implementing legislation requiring gender neutral bathrooms.181 This is feasible. This is 
practical. This is necessary. Our understanding of the human experience is expanding and being 
uncomfortable or unfamiliar with an idea or concept is not adequate justification to deny the 
corresponding legal recognition of that changed understanding.  
VI. Conclusion  
The law has limits, and this may be one of them. It seems unlikely that sexual distinctions 
will be erased in society—certainly not anytime soon. Undoubtedly there are biological differences 
between males and females.182 And these differences are important outside of the law. Sex will 
retain its cultural significance and thus this does not require a sex-blind or gender-blind approach 
to the issues discussed herein. History proves that the furtherance of justice and equality is not 
achieved by blindness.183 Rather the law should be defined and applied in terms of gender rather 
than sex to protect and promote equality. While it is true that theoretically there is equal treatment 
under the law, interpreting sex as gender consistently will encourage actualization of the law of 
the land: All people are created equal and are entitled to be treated as such.  
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